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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effects of optional subdivision on APHP losses for wheat, corn,
and soybeans. Thirty-seven state/crop programs are analyzed and the implications of the
results are discussed in relation to newly developed crop and revenue insurance programs.
The results illustrate the importance of incorporating actuarial experience into the premium
rate structure and contract provisions of an insurance program.
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Beginning with passage of the Federal Crop
Insurance Act of 1980, federally-subsidized
and reinsured crop insurance programs have
been given increasing prominence in U.S.
farm policy. Over the past two decades, a con-
tinuing effort has been made to improve and
expand these programs and elevate their role
as a public policy response to crop producers’
need for risk protection. To this end, avail-
ability of Actual Production History Program
(APHP) coverage has been extended to more
crops and regions, catastrophic coverage pre-
miums have been fully subsidized, and a num-
ber of new yield and revenue insurance prod-
ucts have been approved for government
premium subsidy and reinsurance. 1
Contributing to an increased public policy
emphasis on insurance programs is a widely
held belief that several factors have combined
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1Throughout this paper, APHP is used to refer to
the yield insurance coverage that, until recently, was
commonly referred to as multiple peril crop insurance
(MPCI). Over the past decade, the emergence of new
‘multiple peril’ insurance programs, including the
Group Risk Plan (GRP), introduced in 1993; Cata-
strophic Coverage (CAT), introduced as a distinct de-
rivative of APHP in 1995; Crop Revenue Coverage
(CRC), introduced in 1996; Income Protection (1P),in-
troduced in 1996; and Revenue Assurance (RA), intro-
duced in 1997 has led to a shift away from the generic
name MPCI. We use the acronym APHP rather than
APH to distinguish the insurance program from the
actual production history (APH) yield calculation
method that is the basis for APHP coverage, but is also
used to establish insured yields for CAT, CRC, 1P,and
RA coverage.520 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
to create a more risky economic environment
in U.S. agriculture. Prominent among these
factors are recent trade policy initiatives and
significant changes in U.S. commodity pro-
grams contained in the 1996 Federal Agricul-
tural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act.
Trade initiatives such as the North American
Free Trade Agreement, enacted in 1994, and
provisions of the Uruguay round of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which
were also completed in 1994, are perceived to
have increased risk through greater exposure
of U.S. commodity markets to shocks in in-
ternational markets (Glickrnan). The FAIR Act
is perceived to have removed an important
buffer against price risk through replacement
of the longstanding deficiency payments pro-
gram with transition payments that are not
price-risk responsive.
Given a shift toward greater reliance upon
insurance programs as instruments of public
policy, it is not surprising that considerable at-
tention has focused on the performance of
those programs. Much of this attention has
been directed toward various aspects of the
APHP contract and premium rate structure
that are considered problematic in regard to
producer acceptance or actuarial soundness.
One aspect of the APHP contract structure that
has been the subject of significant controversy
is how insurable units are defined. Two types
of units are insured. For most major commod-
ities, basic units consist of all acreage of the
crop in a county held by the insured under
identical ownership. For example, all of a
farmer’s interest in wheat on land which he or
she owns or cash leases in a county is in one
basic unit, while separate basic units are de-
fined for each landlord on share-leased land.
Optional units are subdivided basic units. The
criteria for optional subdivision are based on
location and production practices. Specifically,
for most commodities optional subdivision is
allowed for land in different sections, under
rectangular survey, 2 and for irrigated versus
dryland production.
2Where legal descriptions are not based on rect-
angular survey, alternative criteria such as Farm Ser-
vices Agency farm serial number and non-contiguity
are used to define insurable units.
Allowing insured farmers to have multiple,
separately insured units has been criticized as
an important source of excessive losses due to
reduced spatial diversity and increased poten-
tial for fraudulent reporting of losses. Smaller,
subdivided units are by nature less spatially
dispersed than large units and, as a result, may
be subject to higher losses because yields are
more highly correlated within the unit. Losses
may be fraudulently reported when a farmer
who has several insured units shifts reported
production from a unit on which a loss is be-
ing reported to another unit, on which there is
no loss, in order to increase the insurance in-
demnity. Optional subdivision is viewed as
particularly conducive to both fraudulent re-
porting and spatial effects because (a) optional
units are configured with minimal spatial di-
versity (all land in the unit is in one section
or, where section designations are not appli-
cable, all land in the unit is often in a contig-
uous tract), (b) optional subdivision greatly in-
creases the total number of insured units on
many farms, hence increasing the likelihood
that when a loss is experienced on one unit
there will be other units, on which there is no
loss, to which reported production can be
shifted, and (c) shifting of reported production
across optional units within the same basic
unit on share-leased land is not inhibited by a
necessity to defraud a landlord as well as the
insurer.
One obvious solution to the potential prob-
lems created by insuring multiple units within
a farm is to eliminate all subdivision and in-
sure at the enterprise-unit (commodity) level.
This solution has been considered and reject-
ed. In 1986, the Federal Crop Insurance Cor-
poration (FCIC) proposed a rule change to de-
fine insured units as all interest of a person in
production of a commodity in a state. This
proposal encountered vigorous opposition
from farmers and the crop insurance industry.
In 1989, the Commission for the Improvement
of the Federal Crop Insurance Program was
emphatic in recommending that unit subdivi-
sion be retained, stating: “The definition of an
insurance unit and the ability to have optional
units are two of the major policy provisions
that determine whether the policy is useful to
a producer.” (p. 23)Knight and Coble: Unit Structure and Actual Production History Program 521
Given that optional subdivision is allowed,
equitable premium rates should reflect any dif-
ference in loss experience for optional and ba-
sic units. In 1988, the FCIC introduced into
its rate structure a 10-percent surcharge for op-
tional subdivision. Following recommenda-
tions of the Commission, this surcharge was
replaced with a 10-percent discount for insur-
ing at the basic unit level, beginning in the
1990 crop year. However, the 10-percent rate
differential was established on the basis of
very limited analysis. A more comprehensive
analysis of the appropriateness of the differ-
ential for different crops and regions has sev-
eral benefits: (a) it will help ensure an equi-
table APHP rate structure, (b) it will provide
similar support for the rate structure of Crop
Revenue Coverage (CRC), the federally sub-
sidized revenue insurance product which has
gained widest acceptance and which relies on
the APHP unit definition and yield-rate struc-
ture, and (c) it will offer guidance in deciding
whether new insurance products should incor-
porate unit definitions similar to those of
APHP or whether a more aggregate unit struc-
ture should be used.3
This paper examines the effects of optional
subdivision on APHP losses for the three larg-
est insured crops: wheat, corn, and soybeans.
In conducting this analysis, we use records on
insured units in states comprising approxi-
mately 85 percent of APHP coverage (insured
liability) on those crops. Importantly, this is
the first time a data set of this magnitude has
been constructed for use in examining any as-
pect of the APHP rate structure. Because of
this, and because in specifying the model to
analyze unit definition we incorporate other
central elements of the rate structure, we also
obtain results relating to several other impor-
tant issues. Specifically, we are able to ex-
amine the appropriateness of (a) rates that are
lower for insured units with high approved
yields relative to the county yield (i.e., the
yield-span or risk area structure of APHP rates
qThe 1P insurance design does not allow separate
units. Revenue Assurance does, but with substantially
larger premium differentials than those for APHP and
CRC.
which has been in effect for most crops since
1986 and has previously been examined by
Skees and Reed, and Goodwin, using yield
data rather than APHP actuarial data), (b) a
penalty structure, adopted in 1994, for in-
sureds who provide less than three years of
yield data in establishing their insured yield,
and (c) lower premium rates for irrigated ver-
sus dryland production.
The remainder of the paper is organized in
four sections. First, we outline aspects of the
APHP contract and rate structure that are im-
portant to our analysis. Next, we describe the
data and estimation methods used. We then
present results of our analysis of 37 state/crop
programs and, in the final section, we offer
suggestions on the broader implications of our
results for established and newly developed
crop and revenue insurance programs.
APHP Contract and Premium Rate
Structure
Actual Production History Program coverage
is currently available for 64 commodities with
670 state/cornrnodity contract offerings.4 Due
to significant inherent differences in the bio-
logical processes involved in production of
such a diverse set of plant species, it is not
surprising that some aspects of the APHP con-
tract are tailored to conform to these unique-
nesses. It is beyond the scope of the present
discussion to provide a comprehensive sum-
mary of contract provisions for all commodi-
ties. However, most essential contract provi-
sions are uniform for major field crops,
including those examined in this study. Our
objective in this section is to provide a de-
scription of contract provisions applicable for
the study crops during the 1992–1996 study
period. For the purpose of conciseness, we fur-
ther narrow the focus to defining terms and
describing components of the contract and rate
structure that have direct bearing on our anal-
ysis. For a more complete description of the
history of the APHP and evolution of general
APHP (and earlier MPCI) contract provisions,
4Information on state/crop programs is based on
APHP sales experience for the 1997 crop year.522 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
Table 1. Definition of Terms and Description of Components of the APHP Contract and Rate
Structure Applicable for the 1992–96 Study Period
Component of
Contract/Rate
Structure ------------------------ Description -------------------------
Transitional Yield (t-yield) l Proxi yields, based cm county yields, that are used in determining the
insured yield for a unit when actual historical yields are not available.
Actual Production History . Years 1992–93—average of 10 years of actual unit-level yields or t-
(APH) Yield yields.
. Years 1994–96
— If 4 or more years of actual yields are provided then average of those
yields.
— If 3 years of actual yields are provided then average of 4 years of
yields including the actual yields and a t-yield for the 4th year.
— If 2 years of actual yields are provided then average of 4 years of
yields including the 2 years of actual yields and 90% of t-yields for
two additional years (i.e., t-yields penalized 10%).
— If 1 year of actual yield is provided then average of 4 years of yields
including the actual yield provided and 809Z0of t-yields for 3 addi-
tional years (i.e., t-yields penalized 20%).
— If no actual yields are provided then 65% of average of 4 years oft-
yields (i.e., t-yields penalized 35%).
Coverage Level . Percent of APH yield insured.
. Ranges from 35 Yo to T5T0 during the study period.
Producer Premium Rate . Tabulated county premium rate (with subsidy) for the coverage level.
. Separate rates for specific production practices such as irrigated and dry-
land production.
. Tabulated rates are also broken out by yield spans which are discrete
categories based on the ratio of the APH yield to the historical average
county yield. Rates decrease as the ratio of the APH to county yield
increases.
. 10VOdiscount for basic versus optional units,
Price Election . Price at which any insured yield loss is indemnified. During the study
period, prices elections from 50 to 100% of an estimated harvest-period
price were available to insureds.
Liability . APH yield . coverage level oacreage . price ekctkm.
Indemnity . (Max (0, ApH Yield . coverage level – realized yield)) . acreage . price
election
Loss-Cost Ratio . Indemnity/Liability
the reader is referred to surveys by Gardner
and Kramer, Goodwin and Smith, and Knight
and Coble. Specific details of individual com-
modity programs can be found in various tech-
nical manuals available from the FCIC.
Components of the APHP contract and rate
structure that have direct bearing on our anal-
ysis are described in Table 1. One mandate of
the 1980 Act was that the FCIC move away
from coverage based on a common yield for
all farms in a county and toward individual-
ized yield coverage. The procedure for deter-
mining the insured yield for a unit has evolved
over time (Goodwin and Smith; Knight and
Coble), Since 1986, insured yields for most
major crops have been based on approved Ac-
tual Production History (APH) yields. In Table
1 we describe how the APH yield was calcu-
lated during the 1992–1996 study period. Dur-
ing this time the basic APH yield calculationKnight and Coble: Unit Structure and Actual Production History Program 523
was modified once, beginning with the 1994
crop year. An important feature of the calcu-
lation process adopted in 1994 is a ‘penalty’
structure for producers who provide less than
three years of actual yields. In this penalty
structure, t-yields (proxy yields, based on
county yields, that are substituted for missing
actual yields in the APH calculation) are fac-
tored downward, with progressively larger
penalties the fewer actual yields provided. The
purpose of these penalties is to encourage pro-
ducers to provide actual yields, which are the
intended basis for APHP coverage. The effect
of the penalty structure for a producer whose
average farm yield is equal to the county yield
is a reduction in coverage or, in effect, an in-
crease in the deductible on the policy.
Coverage levels from 35 percent to 75 per-
cent of the APH yield were offered during the
study period. Our analysis is restricted to the
65-percent and 75-percent levels because
those coverages, in general, represented more
than 95 percent of liability insured under the
APHI? Producer premium rates are the subsi-
dized premium rates per dollar of liability in-
sured. These rates are conditioned on (a) the
coverage level chosen, (b) production practic-
es such as irrigated versus dryland production,
(c) yield spans which are based on the rela-
tionship between the APH yield for the unit
and the historical county average yield, and
(d) optionally subdivided versus basic units. A
10-percent discount for basic versus optional
units is a primary focus of our analysis.
Four additional terms are defined in Table
1. The price election is the price at which any
insured yield loss is indemnified. The APHP
liabili~ is the product of the APH yield and
coverage level (i.e., the insured or guaranteed
yield) multiplied by acreage and the price
election. The APHP indermi~ is zero if the
realized yield is greater than or equal to the
insured yield. If the realized yield is less than
the insured yield, then the indemnity is equal
to the yield shortfall for the unit multiplied by
the acreage and price election. The loss-cost
ratio for an insured unit is the ratio of indem-
nity to liability. This is the measure of unit-
level losses used in our analysis. Importantly,
the expected loss-cost ratio is the actuarially
fair, pure premium rate.5 Thus, the estimated
effect of a factor such as optional subdivision
on the Ioss-cost ratio is its estimated effect on
the actuarially fair premium rate.
Data and Estimation Methods
Here, we describe the data and estimation
methods used in our analysis. Somewhat more
attention than usual is devoted to examination
of attributes of the data because detailed in-
formation on unit structure has not to our
knowledge been reported elsewhere and is es-
sential to understanding the implications of
our results.
Data
Data used in the analysis were obtained from
two sources. Actual Production History Pro-
gram unit-level enrollment records, coverage
information, APH yields, and indemnity re-
cords for the 1992–1996 crop years were ob-
tained from the FCIC. National Agricultural
Statistical Service (NASS) county yields for
1974–1996 were obtained from NASS data-
bases. Variables included in the analysis of
unit-level loss-cost ratios for 13 corn states, 14
soybean states, and 10 wheat states are defined
in Table 2. Seven of the variables including
optional, 75-percent coverage level, percent-
age irrigated, risk-area ratio, 35-percent pen-
alty, 20-percent penalty, and 10-percent pen-
alty are incorporated into the models because
the APHP premium structure, as described in
Table 1, implies that expected loss-cost ratios
(fair premium rates) differ among these fac-
tors.b Yield ratio is included to account for
5It should be noted that since acreage and price
election enter multiplicatively into both the liability
and indemnity they cancel out of the loss-cost ratio
and, hence, do not affect the actuarially fair premium
rate per dollar of liability.
6The role of risk area ratio in the APHP premium
structure is important, meriting further elaboration. As
indicated in Table 1 under the heading ‘Producer Pre-
mium Rate,’ the APHP rate table for a crop in a county
contains rates that vary substantially across yield
spans, which are discrete ranges of the ratio of insured
unit APH yield to an historical average yield for the
county. Risk area ratio is a continuous representation
of this relationship, which is descretized by the FCIC
for the purpose of presentation in APHP rate tables.524 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
Table 2. Definition of Variables Included in Models of Unit-Level APHP Loss-Cost Ratios













Dummy variable equal to 1 if the unit is insured as an optional unit and O if
insured as a basic unit.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the unit is insured at the 75% level and O if
insured at the 65’%0 level.
Continuous variable indicating the percent of liability in the insured unit that
is on irrigated acreage.
Continuous variable equal to the ratio of the unit APH yield to the estimated
county yield for the year.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a 35% penalty on t-yields was applied in the
APH calculation due to provision of no actual yields in years 1994–96.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a 20’ZO penalty on t-yields was applied in the
APH calculation due to provision of only 1 year of actual yields in years
1994–96.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a 10% penalty on t-yields was applied in the
APH calculation due to provision of only 2 years of actual yields in years
1994–96.
Ratio of actual to predicted county yield in the year, *
Percentage share of crop on the unit owned by the insured.
Total acres in the insured unit.
Dummy variables for each county in the state.
Dummy variables for years 1992–96.
* Actual county yield is the NASS county yield for the year. Predicted county yield is a trend-adjusted predicted county
yield for the year based on 23 years of NASS county yields,
general production conditions in each county
and year. Ownership share is included to re-
flect differences in loss-reporting incentives
for owners of a large interest in the production
from a unit versus those whose ownership in-
terest is small. Acreage is included to account
for differences in losses that may result from
pooling of larger, and perhaps more geograph-
ically dispersed, acreages and from differences
in incentives to report losses (especially small
losses) on small versus large units. County
dummy variables are included to reflect dif-
ferences in riskiness of production across
counties, while year dummy variables account
for any other yeat-specific environmental or
program factors that might affect loss experi-
ence,
Table 3gives number of observations and
means of all variables except year and county
dummy variables. The number of observations
in our state-level models ranges from 7,000
for Louisiana soybeans to more than 500,000
for Kansas wheat. The percentage of insured
units that are optional units is similar for corn
and soybeans and is somewhat higher in most
wheat states. The percent of units insured at
the 75-percent coverage level is less than 25
percent for most state/crop programs, but is as
high as 84 percent for Washington wheat. Ir-
rigated acreage was eliminated from the anal-
ysis in any state in which it accounted for less
than 2 percent of insured liability. Among the
remaining states, the percent of liability on ir-
rigated acreage is highest for Nebraska corn,
at 45 percent. Risk area ratio ranges from ap-
proximately 0.7 to 1.48, while the mean per-
cent of units in each of the three APH penalty
categories (3590 penalty, 20% penalty, and
10% penalty) is in the 4-percent to 12-percent
range in most states. Yield ratio would take a
value of 1.00 in a year when the actual yield
was equal to the expected yield for that year.
Average values of the variable at the state lev-
el, across all years, range from 0,84 for
Oklahoma wheat to 1.24 for Mississippi soy-
beans. Average ownership share of insureds is
in the 60-percent to 96-percent range for all
crops and states. Average acreage in insuredKnight and Coble: Unit Structure and Actual Production History Program 525
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Table4. Summary of Effect of Optional Unit
Subdivision on Avera~e Size of Insured Units
Mean of Unit Size
Basic Basic
Units That Units That
WlllBe Subdivided Are Not
Subdivided Units Subdivided
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corn units is less than 100 for all corn states
except Texas. Size of insured soybean units is
also substantially less than 100 acres in Mid-
western states but is larger in Mississippi Del-
ta states. Insured wheat units are larger, par-
ticularly in Montana and Washington.
The means reported in Table 3 do not pro-
vide a sense of the variability of the data
across counties and insured units. Because of
the number of state programs included in the
analysis, economy of presentation does not
permit a thorough reporting of all descriptive
statistics in this paper. However, we do con-
sider it important to provide a clearer picture
of the effect optional subdivision has on the
APHP unit structure. Of particular interest is
a comparison of the size of basic units that are
not subdivided with those that are subdivided
and insured as optional units. Tables 4 and 5
provide this information. Table 4 shows the
effect of optional subdivision on average in-
sured unit size for all states. In Illinois corn,
for example, the mean size of basic units that
are optionally subdivided is 248 acres before
subdivision, After subdivision, the mean size
of the optional units into which these relative-
ly large basic units are split is 69 acres, com-
pared with a mean size of 72 acres for basic
units that are not optionally subdivided. This
general pattern holds true across all three
crops in all states. Through optional subdivi-
sion, large basic units are split into optional
units that are very similar in average size to
smaller basic units that are not subdivided.
Thus, state-level means indicate that optional
subdivision has a significant equalizing effect
on insured unit size.7
It is not feasible to provide a detailed anal-
ysis of the distribution of unit sizes for all the
7Our conclusion regarding the similarity of size of
units insured as basic and optional units is based on
operational (agronomic) considerations rather than sta-
tistical criteria. Differences in means for “subdivided
units” (i.e., optional units) and “basic units that are
not subdivided” (i.e., basic units) are, in fact, statisti-
cally significant at the 5-percent level for all but two
state/crop programs (based on two-tailed z tests). How-
ever, agronomically one would not expect these differ-
ences, which are less than 15 acres for all but six state/
crop programs, to have important effects on the
riskiness of production.
Table 5. Percentiles of Insured Unit Size Dis-
tributions for Iowa Corn, Arkansas Soybeans,
and Kansas Wheat
Basic
Basic Units Units That
That Will Be Subdivided Are Not
Subdivided Units Subdivided
Percentile (Acres) (Acres) (Acres)
--------------- Iowa Corn ---------------
lath 80 21 25
25th 122 37 38
50th 195 63 65
75th 320 91 94
90th 504 140 140
----------- Arkansas Soybeans ------------
lath 100 21 19
25th 173 39 36
50th 314 77 77
75th 623 150 160
90th 1,100 266 324
------------- Kansas Wheat --------------
10th 81 21 23
25th 130 39 39
50th 214 70 67
75th 367 111 102
90th 626 158 154
crops and states. However, such information
for a few representative state/crop programs
can provide a good sense of the nature of the
effects of optional subdivision. Selected per-
centiles of unit size distributions for Iowa
corn, Arkansas soybeans, and Kansas wheat
are reported in Table 5. Iowa corn and Kansas
wheat are used as examples because these
states have the largest number of insured units
for those crops, while Arkansas soybeans is
chosen to add regional diversity. Two features
of the distributional information provided in
Table 5 are striking: (a) a large number of in-
sured units, both basic and optional, are quite
small (25Y0 of units in all three state/crop pro-
grams are less than 40 acres in total size), and
(b) the distributions of insured unit size are
remarkably similar for basic units that are not
subdivided and for optionally subdivided units
(after the subdivision has been done). With
minor exceptions, both of these relationships
hold true for all states and crops included in528 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
our analysis. Hence, the effect of optional sub-
division on the distribution of unit size is the
same as its effect on mean size: through op-
tional subdivision the size distributions of
units insured as basic and optional units are
largely equalized.
Estimation Methods
The basic methodological approach used in
the study is regression analysis of actual
APHP loss experience (loss-cost ratios). Un-
like simulation approaches, which have pre-
viously been used in analyzing the effects of
unit structure (Shurle), this approach permits
us to use the large database available on actual
loss experience under the APHP contract pro-
visions and to capture behavioral effects, such
as possible actuarial effects of fraudulent shift-
ing of reported production. The latter advan-
tage is particularly important since behavioral
aspects of the optional subdivision decision
have been a primary focus of concern and crit-
icism.
Actual Production History Program in-
sured-unit loss-cost ratios take values between
O, when there is no loss, and 1, when there is
a total loss (i.e., indemnity = liability). Given
the mixed discrete/continuous nature of the
distribution of the dependent variable, the
analysis is conducted using a two-limit tobit
estimator, with limits of O and 1. Our models
are of the form:
LC,, = a + d;,tir+ d@’ + dffi[’+ Z,,~
+ E,, = XJI + E,,;
E[e,,] = E[x[,6,,,] = O b’ i, t and j, s;
E[e,,e,,] = O V i # j or t# s;
E[6~] = U2;
where LC,[ is the unit-level loss-cost ratio for
insured unit i in time period t;dj is a 1 X (m
– 1) vector of dummy variables for m – 1 of
m total counties included in the state model
(data for a county were eliminated from the
analysis if fewer than 50 units were insured
during the study period); dj is a 1 X 4 vector
of dummy variables for crop years 1993–96;
dfiis a 1 X 5 vector of values of the program-
related dummy variables optional, 75-percent
coverage level, 35-percent penalty, 20-percent
penalty, and 10-percent penalty; Zi, is a 1 X 5
vector of values of the continuous variables
percent irrigated, risk area ratio, yield ratio,
ownership share, and acreage; a is a scalar
parameter; 8’, 8’, 8P, and W are conformably-
scaled column vectors of parameters; xi, = [1
d:, d;, dg z,,]; ~’ = [a i3c8’ & W]’; and e,, is
a random disturbances
Computation of Optional Subdivision Efiects
A central result reported in the following sec-
tion is the estimated effect of optional subdi-
vision on APHP loss-cost ratios for each crop
in each state. These are percentage differences
in expected loss-cost ratios for basic versus
optional units and, hence, can be compared di-
rectly with the 10-percent discount currently
given for units insured at the basic unit level.
Expected loss-cost ratios used in these calcu-
lations are computed from the two-limit tobit
model parameter estimates as:
E[LC,, Ixi,] = L@, + U(I – @u)
+ (0” – @L)x,J3 + u(l$L – +“),
where L and U are the lower (zero) and upper
(one) limits, respectively;
@, = @[(j – xi,~)kr],
+ = @[(j - X,,PYJI, j= L,U;
u is the maximum likelihood estimate of the
8The dummy variables 35-percent penalty, 20-per-
cent penal@, and IO-percent penalty are included in
the model to account for any effects of reduced yield
coverages, during the years 1994–96, for insureds who
provided less than three years of actual yields for the
APH yield calculation. Values of these variables are all
zeros for the years 1992 and 1993. This does not create
a potential specification problem, with these variables
picking up year effects in addition to the effects they
are intended to measure, because year dummy vari-
ables are also included in the model. Although only 4
percent to 12 percent of observations fall in each of
these categories (Table 3), given the overall sample
sizes this should not pose a problem in estimation of
these effects.Knight and Coble: Unit Structure and Actual Production History Program 529
Table 6. Summary of Tobit Model Results for Models of Unit-Level APHP Loss-Cost Ratios
on Corn, Soybeans, and Wheat*
corn Soybeans Wheat
Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg.
and and Not and and Not and and Not
Variable Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig.
Optional 8 1 4 11 03 7 1 2
75% Coverage Level 13 00 14 00 9 0 1
% Irrigated 3 2 1 0 1 4 3 3 1
Risk Area Ratio 1 12 0 0 13 1 1 81
35% Penalty o 10 3 0 10 4 0 6 4
2070 Penalty o 9 4 0 10 4 0 8 2
1O% Penalty 1 66 0 86 0 55
Yield Ratio o 13 0 0 14 0 0 10 0
Ownership Share 12 1 0 14 0 0 10 00
Acreage 7 5 1 13 0 1 7 2 1
*Abbreviations used in the table are ‘pos, and slg.’ for positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, ‘neg. and
sig.’ for negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, and ‘not sig.’ for not statistically significant at the 10%
level. Entries in the table indicate the number of state models for the crop in which the parameter estimate on the
variable was in each of the three sign/significance categories. For example, the results for “optional” in the 13 state
corn models indicate that tbe variable had a positive sign and was statistically significant in 8 state models, had a
negative sign and was statistically significant in 1 state model, and was not statistically significant in 4 state models.
standard deviation of the normal distribution
and $ and @ are the normal density and cu-
mulative distribution functions, respectively.
The effects reported in the following section
are means of effects calculated at each data
point. Given the nonlinear nature of the esti-
mator, this approach is more appropriate than
the common practice of calculating effects at
the means of the data. This is especially true
in the present application where expected loss-
cost ratios are quite different in ‘average’
years (means of the data) than in good or poor
production years.
Results
Tobit model results for the 37 state/crop pro-
grams are presented in Table 6. Because of the
number of models estimated, these results are
presented in a summarized form that lends it-
self to economical presentation and easy in-
terpretation. A full reporting of parameter es-
timates is included in Appendix Table Al for
the reader who is interested in detailed infor-
mation on individual-state models.
Information reported in Table 6 summariz-
es the algebraic signs and statistical signifi-
cance of each independent variable in the state
level models of five-year APHP loss-cost ra-
tios. The sign on optional is positive and the
parameter estimate is statistically significant in
26 of 37 state/crop models: eight of 13 corn
states, 11 of 14 soybean states, and seven of
10 wheat states. In all but two of the remain-
ing cases there is no statistically significant
difference in loss-cost ratios for basic and op-
tional insured units. Thus, our results, in gen-
eral, support the incorporation of a rate differ-
ential between basic and optional units in the
APHP and CRC rate structures. An analysis of
the appropriateness of the current 10-percent
discount for insuring basic units will be pre-
sented after the other model results in Table 6
have been examined.
There is almost complete consistency in the
model results relating to the 75-percent cov-
erage level, Expected loss-cost ratios for 36 of
37 state/crop insurance programs are higher
for 75-percent than for 65-percent coverage.
This is an expected result, which is consistent
with the APHP premium rate structure.
Results relating to irrigated production are
mixed. The preponderance of evidence for
soybean states suggests no significant differ-530 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
ence in loss-cost ratios for irrigated and dry-
land production practices. Results for corn and
wheat exhibit more statistical significance but
vary in sign. Since APHP premium rates for
irrigated production are lower than or equal to
those for dryland production within a county,
the estimated positive and significant effects
for some state/crop programs are inconsistent
with the rate structure. For some state/crop
programs, these results may stem from the fact
that the five-year study period did not include
a severe drought year, when the loss-mitigat-
ing benefits of irrigation would be strongest.
However, at least in the case of wheat, it is
unlikely that this fully explains our results. As
the parameter estimates in Appendix Table A 1
show, the wheat states with negative and sig-
nificant estimated effects of irrigation (i.e.,
lower loss-cost ratios for irrigated than dry-
Iand practices) are Kansas, Oklahoma, and
Texas, while estimated effects of irrigated pro-
duction are positive and significant for Mon-
tana, Nebraska, and Washington. Personnel at
Risk Management Agency (RMA) regional
service offices in Spokane, Washington; Bill-
ings, Montana; and Topeka, Kansas have been
aware of unexpectedly high loss experience on
irrigated wheat production in the northern
states since the mid- 1980s. Thus, this appears
to be a long-term phenomenon that is con-
firmed by our study results.
Parameter estimates on risk area ratio are
negative and significant in all but four of 37
models. This result is important, because it is
the first time the APHP actuarial data have
been used to analyze the relationship between
farm (insured unit) yields, expected county
yields, and actuarially-fair APHP (or CRC)
premium rates. Our results are consistent with
the yield-distribution results of Skees and
Reed, and Goodwin. These results support the
1985 modification of the APHP rate structure
to provide lower premium rates for insured
units with high approved yields relative to the
historical average county yield.
Results relating to the penalty structure for
providing less than three years of actual yields
for the APH calculation (parameter estimates
on 35-percent penalty, 20-percent penalty, and
10-percent penalty) exhibit a pattern that has
important implications for the validity of this
feature of the APHP and CRC rate structures.
Specifically, the preponderance of the models
indicate that APHP loss-cost ratios are lower
(negative and significant parameter estimates)
for insured units on which these coverage pen-
alties are imposed. This suggests that the cov-
erage penalties more than compensate for any
difference in riskiness of units on which lim-
ited historical yield information is provided.
Yield ratio takes a negative sign and is sta-
tistically significant in all of the state/crop
models, This is not surprising since the loss-
cost ratio would be expected to be high in
years when the county yield is lower than nor-
mal (generally unfavorable production years)
and low in years of higher-than-normal county
yields (favorable production years). No direct
implications derive from this result, but inclu-
sion of the variable in the models is important
because it is the best available measure of pro-
duction conditions in each year, localized to
the county level.
Ownership share has a positive and signif-
icant estimated effect on loss-cost ratios in all
but one of 37 state/crop models. This suggests
that the larger the share an individual holds in
an insured unit the more indemnified losses
are relative to liability. We believe that trans-
action costs likely account for this result, as
well as the positive and significant estimated
effect of acreage in the preponderance of our
models. Specifically, a larger ownership share
or larger insured unit provides greater incen-
tive to incur the cash and opportunity costs of
time and effort to report and validate a loss.
These costs, which are largely independent of
size of loss, would exceed the indemnity in
cases of small per-acre losses (small yield
shortfalls) on small units and/or on units in
which the insured holds a small ownership
share.9 The result for acreage may appear
gAlthough average ownership shares presented in
Table 3 are relatively high, there are a significant pro-
portion of insured units, especially in the 1995 and
1996 crop years when strong incentives were provided
to insure, on which the ownership share is small (i.e.,
less than 20%), These are likely landlords who are part
owners of the land. Clearly, for these persons the in-
centive to report say a two-bushel-per-acre com lossKnight and Coble: Unit Structure and Actual Production History Program 531
counterintuitive due to an a priori expectation
that larger units are composed of more hetero-
geneous soils and will have less highly cor-
related yields than small units. However, it
should be remembered that most insured units,
both basic and optional, are small enough so
that any expected loss-reducing effect of unit
size would be small. Our results suggest that
any such effects are outweighed by the re-
duced incentive to incur the costs of establish-
ing losses on small acreages.
Estimated fair discounts for basic versus
optional units are given in Table 7. A zero
discount is reported if the parameter estimate
on optional is not statistically different than
zero (see Table 6 and Appendix Table A 1).
Consistent with the results summarized in Ta-
ble 6, the estimated effects are positive and
significant for eight of 13 corn states, 11 of 14
soybean states, and seven of 10 wheat states.
Two aspects of the general pattern of these
results are central to the ongoing debate about
unit structure. The first aspect was identified
in the discussion of Table 6. To reiterate, it is
that the preponderance of our results suggests
that loss-cost ratios are higher for optional
than for basic units. Given that basic and op-
tional units are essentially identically distrib-
uted in size, a reasonable null hypothesis
might have been that there would be no sta-
tistically significant difference between losses
for the two types of units. However, in 70 per-
cent (26 of 37) of the state/crop programs an-
alyzed, estimated loss-cost ratios are signifi-
cantly higher for optional than for basic units
(i.e., parameter estimates on optional are pos-
itive and statistically significant). Thus, a pre-
mium rate discount for basic units (or sur-
charge for optional units as was originally
implemented in 1988) is generally appropriate.
The second aspect of our results that has
direct implications for the unit structure debate
is that we do not find evidence of a general
insufficiency of the penalty (loss of a discount)
associated with optional subdivision. Our me-
on a 40-acre unit is small (indemnity of $32 for a price
election of $2 and an ownership share of 209io),while
the opportunity cost of the time and effort required is
nontrivial.
Table 7. Estimated Actuarially-Fair Percent-
age Discounts for Basic Versus Optional Units
Estimated Fair
State Discount (%)














































































dian estimated discounts for basic units are ap-
proximately 9 percent for soybeans, 4 percent
for corn, and 5 percent for wheat. Although
these discounts vary substantially among
states, they exceed the current 10-percent lev-532 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
cl—in most cases only modestly—in only nine
of the 37 state/crop programs analyzed. Thus,
our results indicate that the current 10-percent
discount is, in general, more than adequate to
correct for increased losses due to optional
subdivision. This finding is counter to claims
that abuses associated with the proliferation of
units through optional subdivision are a major
source of actuarial insufficiency in the insur-
ance program.
Apart from these general implications, our
results raise the additional issue of whether a
uniform rate differential is appropriate across
all APHP state/crop programs. Our estimated
fair discounts vary across commodities and
among states for each of the three commodi-
ties studied. The median estimated discount
for soybeans is very close to the current 10-
percent level. For corn and wheat, however, it
appears that a discount of approximately half
the current level is justified. Tailoring of dis-
counts to conform with commodity-level ac-
tuarial experience would appear appropriate.
Further, such refinement of the APHP and
CRC rate structures should be operationally
feasible, with the primary cost being the de-
velopment of appropriate discounts for other
commodities, using methods similar to those
employed in the present study.
Our results also show substantial variation
in fair discounts among states for each of the
three commodities. Tailoring of rates to reflect
such differences should be operationally fea-
sible, but political implications are a serious
concern. Significant variation in APHP rates
between contiguous counties has been a polit-
ically sensitive issue throughout the life of the
program. This sensitivity has led to the mod-
ification of rate-setting procedures to smooth
rates at the crop reporting district level. A sim-
ilar controversy would appear inevitable if the
discount for basic units were substantially dif-
ferent for a given commodity across state
lines, which, like counties, would be viewed
by producers as arbitrary political boundaries.
Thus, we believe the benefits of state-specific
discounts are likely outweighed by direct costs
and substantial difficulties that would be posed
in program administration.
Concluding Comments
A substantial base of actuarial experience pro-
vides a basis for refinements to the APHP con-
tract design. The analysis presented in this ar-
ticle makes the most extensive use to date of
those data in examining the validity of several
revisions introduced into the rate structure
since 1985. Our results illustrate the impor-
tance of incorporating actuarial experience
into the premium rate structure and contract
provisions of an insurance program. Purely
theoretical rate setting has significant short-
comings. In particular, theoretical rates cannot
capture behavioral effects of the insurance
contract design.
Tko issues examined in this article are con-
sidered to be at least partly behavioral. Higher
losses for optional than for basic units are be-
lieved to arise, at least in part, from shifting
of production between units when losses are
reported. 10 The penalty structure for insuring
on the basis of limited yield experience was
incorporated into APHP rates to account for a
selection process in which farms with yields
lower than the county average elect to use
county yields, in order to obtain artificially-
inflated coverage, while farms with yields
higher than the county average provide actual
yields for the APH calculation. The magnitude
of such behavioral effects can be examined
only through use of actuarial experience.
The need to incorporate actuarial experi-
ence into insurance contract designs has two
important implications in the present policy
context in which greater importance has been
placed on existing and newly-designed insur-
ance programs. First, for an established insur-
ance program like APHP, it is important to
maintain a consistent database on actuarial ex-
perience and to use that database in refining
the contract provisions, Second, behavioral ef-
10It should be noted that fraudulent reporting of
losses is not the only behavioral factor that might con-
tribute to higher losses for optional than for basic units.
It is also possible that an adverse selection process in
the decision to subdivide contributes to this difference,
Clearly, our methods, which rely upon a dummy var-
iable to capture the total optional subdivision effect, do
not identify the sources of that effect.Knight and Coble: Unit Structure and Actual Production History Program 533
fects pose a challenge for new insurance de-
signs, One approach to meet this challenge is
to rely upon established designs, to the extent
possible, as has been done in the yield cov-
erage component of CRC. A second approach
is to supplement theoretical rates with adjust-
ment factors based on experience for other
programs and then to incorporate actuarial ex-
perience for the contract as soon as sufficient
data have accumulated to support reliable
analysis. Unfortunately, during the time period
when purely theoretical rates or theoretical
rates with arbitrary adjustments are used, the
performance of new programs is likely to be
affected by a poorly calibrated rate structure.
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Appendix
Table Al. Parameter Estimates
Corn, Soybeans, and Wheat
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
for Tobit Models of Unit-Level APHP Loss-Cost Ratios on
Parameter Estimates for Corn Models
Variable/Statistic IL IN IA KS MI MN
INTERCEPT 1.3856* 2,3247* 1.1783* 1.3537* 2.4265* 1.0436*
Optional 0.0260* 0.0449” 0.0146* 0.0628* –0.0063 0.0120*
75% coverage level 0.0905* 0.1688* 0.1382* 0.1667* 0.3009* 0.1141*
% Irrigated — — — –0.0848* –0.1109 —
Risk Area Ratio –0.2727* –0.4173* –0.2615* 0.0918* –0.7296* –0.3929*
35q0 Penalty –O.11OI* –0.1807* –0.0286* –0.0357* –0.2518* –0.0665*
20% Penalty –O.1O85* –0.1779* –0.0239” –0.0289 –0,2028* –0.01 11
10% Penalty –0.0471* –0.0478” –0.0349* 0.0662* –0.0673 –0.0140
Yield Ratio –1.3999* –2,4437* –1.5259* – 1.9845* –2.3232* –1.2155*
Ownership Share 0.1187* 0.1236* 0.0988* 0.0994* 0.2895* 0.0830*
Acreage 0,0003* 0.0004* O.0001* 0.0008 –0.0005* –0.0001*
Parameter Estimates for Soybean Models




































































Parameter Estimates for Wheat Models













INTERCEPT 1.1238* 1.1105* 0.5036* 0.8875* 1.0225*
Optional 0.0370* 0.0383” –0.0151* 0.0070 O.O1O9*
75% coverage level 0.1935* 0.1824* 0.0978* 0.1891* 0.1586*
7. Irrigated –0.0114 –o. 107O* — 0.3151* 0.1853*
Risk Area Ratio –0.2005* –0.1988* 0.0269* –0.1185* –0.1551*
35% Penalty –0.0354 –0.1387* –0.0103 0.0236 –O.1O32*
20% Penalty –0.0932” –0.1083” –0.0174 0.0148 –0.085 1*
1O% Penalty –0.0386* –0.0487* –0.0048 –0.0126 –0.0402*
Yield Ratio –1.8116* – 1.7667* –0.9813* –1.3081* – 1,8250*
Ownership Share 0.0816* 0.0832* 0.0389* 0.0841* 0.0877*
Acreage 0.0002* –0.0001 * 0.0002” 0.0004* 0.0000
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Appendix
Table Al. (Extended)
Parameter Estimates for Corn Models






































































































































































Parameter Estimates for Wheat Models
OK SD TX WA
0.9144*
0.0304*
0.2116*
–0.1509*
–0.2446*
0.0070
–0.0395*
–0.0039
– 1.2203*
0.1189*
–0.0001*
1.5952*
0.0465*
0,0652
—
0.0019
–0.1739*
–0.1317*
–0.0690*
–1.8843*
0,0966*
0.0001”
0.2627*
0.0655*
0.1157*
–0.3951*
–O.1O73*
–0.0731*
–0.0399*
–0.0046
–0.8587*
0.1487*
0.0003”
0.7835*
0.0391*
0.1236*
0.1118*
–0.2119*
–0.0490*
–0.0743*
–0.0228
–1.0281*
0.0623*
0.0001